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Judge Paul Crotty’s attack on Chapter 7 of Fighting for the City1 is not guilty of
understatement. Comments that he makes, such as one that my “sourcing . . . is
troublesome,” 2 another that I am “out of touch . . . with what goes on in the
Corporation Counsel’s office,”3 and a third accusing me of “an open attempt to
introduce prejudice,”4 undermine the scholarly integrity of the entire book, which
Judge Crotty, at one point, labels a “polemic.”5 Comments such as these require a
response on my part.6
Writing history, in my view, entails more than simply reading and summarizing
sources in an archive. Nothing I ever have written or ever will write reflects such a
cramped view of the historian’s art, and I never misrepresented myself as a mere
antiquarian to those with whom I discussed whether I should undertake this project.
The historian’s task is to place archival facts in a broader context that helps explain
the past meaningfully to the present. Thus, I reject out-of-hand Judge Crotty’s
criticisms that I incorporated into the book material not based on any documents
from the Law Department’s files7 that “has nothing to do with the history of the
Law Department.”8 I do not know any other way to write history than to bring
outside context to bear on documents in archives. Of course, I agree with Judge
Crotty that history “should be accurate” and not based on an author’s “own facts.”9
1.

William E. Nelson, Fighting for the City: A History of the New York City Corporation
Counsel 183–219 (2008).

2.

Paul A. Crotty, A Response: Why William Nelson’s Analysis of the Law Department 1946–1965 Is Wrong, 53
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 519, 522 (2009). The particular reference Judge Crotty is questioning is to an interview
of Edith Spivak by John Hogrogian. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 190 n.15. It is obvious from the reference
that Edith Spivak is the person being quoted, and, if Judge Crotty had checked the reference, the obvious
would have been confirmed.

3.

Crotty, supra note 2, at 522 n.9. I am “out of touch,” says Judge Crotty, because I allegedly portrayed Peter
Campbell Brown in a “demeaning way” for his efforts to keep the Brooklyn Dodgers in New York. Id. I
have reread the paragraph to which Judge Crotty refers several times and fail to see anything demeaning
about it. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 190 n.15. And I certainly am not out of touch with the role that the
Law Department has played in encouraging business, including sports businesses, to come to and remain in
New York. See id. at 264–65. For an example of the role the Law Department has played in encouraging
sports businesses to remain in New York, see Michael A. Cardozo, The New York City Corporation Counsel:
The Best Legal Job in America, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 459, 475 (2009) (describing the work done by Law
Department attorneys to negotiate the construction of new stadium facilities for the Yankees and Mets).

4.

Crotty, supra note 2, at 526 (referring to Nelson, supra note 1, at 202–03). This scandalous accusation
is without evidentiary support and simply wrong. In fact, I have always admired the efforts of the
Catholic Church to fight Communism on behalf of the faithful. I was thrilled when, slightly more than
a decade ago, I heard a Budapest congregation sing the Hungarian national anthem at the end of Mass;
the singing made clear how much the Church meant to Hungarian freedom, and it renewed my faith
that my prayers for Cardinal Mindszenty four decades earlier had meant something. None of this,
however, assuages my concern for the many loyal American citizens whose lives were destroyed by the
anti-Communism of the 1950s. See generally Nelson, supra note 1, at 195–213.

5.

Crotty, supra note 2, at 521.

6.

Judge Crotty also takes me to task for ignoring the tremendous changes in New York between 1946 and
1966 and the Law Department’s involvement in them. In fact, I discussed many of the issues he
mentions. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 193–95.

7.

See Crotty, supra note 2, at 525.

8.

Id. at 528.

9.

Id. at 520.
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But a historian can never achieve factual accuracy by ignoring information widely
known to other professional historians10 simply because some lay readers, as a result
of their preexisting ethical commitments, find the information offensive and demand
that it “be corrected.”11
Perhaps I am overreacting to Judge Crotty’s decision to cast his critique in the
strong language of advocacy rather than in calmer language of inquiry. Perhaps his
words that I have quoted above, and others like them, are mere hyperbole. Perhaps
he and I only disagree about a fairly narrow issue—namely, the context in which I
put the facts about the Law Department’s activities against Communists in the late
1940s and the 1950s. If that is the nub of our disagreement, I think I owe an
explanation of how I came to identify that context.
In persuading me to undertake this project, Michael Cardozo promised, as I
indicated in the acknowledgments, that I would be free to determine the book’s
substance. There was only one exception: Cardozo told me that the book had to be
dedicated to Allen Schwartz and that it had to recognize the special contribution
that Allen had made to the creation of the Law Department we know today. I
quickly came to appreciate how special Allen was and how, with the support of
Mayor Ed Koch, he did, in fact, transform the Law Department for the better. But
that only brought me to the deeper issue of how to define the transformation: how
did the Law Department Allen Schwartz created differ from the one he had
inherited?
The Law Department Allen Schwartz inherited had not been created solely by
the Beame administration or even by the Beame and Lindsay administrations
together. It went back far—at least to the early twentieth century days of Tammany
Hall. I sought to understand Tammany as an anti-elitist, small-d democratic entity
striving to give the common people of the city both jobs in and policy control over
the Law Department. There is much to be said in favor of democracy, and I believe
I said it.12 But if I was going to explain how Allen Schwartz made the Law
Department better, I also had to discuss democracy’s downsides, such as its reliance
on political patronage and the negative effects of patronage on internal operations.
That was the “historical purpose”13 served by my reporting Edith Spivak’s somewhat
unfavorable comments about Edward McLaughlin, as well as my many other, less
than favorable judgments about some other staff members who are no longer alive.
10. The Catholic Church’s anti-Communism and its effects on American politics in the late 1940s and the

1950s have been a subject of substantial historical scholarship. See infra note 15.
11.

See Crotty, supra note 2, at 520.

12. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 1, at 149–54. I agree with Judge Crotty that “Catholics and Jews were

excluded from Ivy League Schools or admitted in only small numbers” prior to World War II, and that
Tammany’s post-war appointment policies probably reflected that fact. Crotty, supra note 2, at 521,
528. As I said more than once in Fighting for the City, “Tammany used the Law Department as a vehicle
of upward mobility for young men, and even young women, of ambition,” Nelson, supra note 1, at 138,
and found it “more important to employ attorneys who remain close to the people than attorneys with
elite backgrounds and fancy academic training.” Id. at 151; see also id. at 109–10.
13. Crotty, supra note 2, at 522.
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I also had to analyze the downsides of popular influence on Law Department
policy. In so doing, I do not see how I could have avoided discussing one of the
darkest moments in the Department’s history—namely, the activities against
Communists in the late 1940s and the 1950s that were highlighted in the Department’s
own annual reports.14 And, once I had decided to address mid-twentieth century
anti-Communism, I do not see how I could have ignored the large body of historical
scholarship connecting it to the Catholic Church.15 I could not, as I think Judge
Crotty would have been inclined to do, simply ignore or condemn that professional
literature. What I did try to do was develop a more nuanced understanding than it
reflected—an understanding, incidentally, more favorable to the Church.
In the end, I explicitly said that the Catholic Church should not be blamed for
the Law Department’s dark moment. Instead, we should attribute the darkness to a
systemic failure of democracy. I wrote that
those in the hierarchy like Cardinal Spellman who called for action against
Communism rightly held sincere beliefs. The Church properly saw
Communism as “essentially atheistic and irreligious . . . and opposed to . . .
what the church was about, namely the world of God and the spirit.” As
experience in Eastern Europe had demonstrated, Communists were prepared
to persecute the faithful if given a chance, and there was every reason for
Church prelates, personally acquainted as they often were with victims of that
persecution, to urge the faithful to support fellow Catholics around the world,
to protect each other, to fight back, and to resist what they saw as incursions
on the Church by American secularists that paralleled those by Eastern
European Communists.16

I also made it clear that the Tammany Corporation Counsels did
“not take orders from any Pope, Cardinal, Bishop or priest, nor would they try
to give . . . orders.” Those who searched for Communists in city government
acted as they did not because the Church gave them orders, but because they
understood that the voters who had put Tammany in power wanted them so to
act.17

The problem thus lay with the voters themselves and with the democratic ideal that
the public lawyer should be bound by the wishes of the people who put her in office.
As I wrote:
14.

For a brief discussion of these reports, see Nelson, supra note 1, at 202–03.

15.

This scholarship, which is cited in Chapter 7, includes Donald F. Crosby, God, Church, and Flag:
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and the Catholic Church, 1950–1957 (1978); Mark S. Massa,
Catholics and American Culture: Fulton Sheen, Dorothy Day, and the Notre Dame
Football Team (1999); Charles R. Morris, American Catholic: The Saints and Sinners Who
Built America’s Most Powerful Church (1997); Jim Tuck, McCarthyism and New York’s
Hurst Press: A Study of Roles in the Witch Hunt (1995); Joshua M. Zeitz, White Ethnic
New York: Jews, Catholics, and the Shaping of Postwar Politics (2007); Donald F. Crosby,
The Jesuits and Joe McCarthy, 46 Church Hist. 374 (1977).

16. Nelson, supra note 1, at 210.
17.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
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We may, that is, need to recognize that ordinary voters simply lack the
capacity to fine tune messages they hear from religious leaders and other
spokespeople for moral interests, and that society accordingly needs lawyers
to scrutinize attempts to translate religious values into public policy. In the
context of mid-twentieth century New York, where Roman Catholics were a
majority or near majority of voters, we may need to recognize that, in the
absence of such scrutiny, democracy ineluctably gave the Church hierarchy
significant, albeit imperceptible inf luence over the Law Department—
influence which the hierarchy did not necessarily seek to exert and with which
no one in the Law Department consciously complied, but which was
nonetheless real.18

Judge Crotty is wrong in calling the language from Fighting for the City that I
have just quoted a “false disclaimer.”19 Chapter 7 never advanced the post hoc ergo
propter hoc claim “that the Catholic Archdiocese of New York . . . induced Catholic
Corporation Counsels to pursue Communists in city government” by “somehow
acting on the Church’s anti-Communist bidding.”20 Chapter 7 merely elaborated a
series of parallel, contemporaneous historical developments from which Judge Crotty
drew an erroneous post hoc ergo propter hoc conclusion. Chapter 7 was clear on the
first full page on which it discussed the Law Department’s anti-Communism—that
the Department was “in thrall to a majoritarian democratic ethos,” not to the Church
hierarchy. 21
Judge Crotty believes fervently in majoritarian democracy. He believes that “the
Law Department is not a free agent. It did,” he says, “what the law requires: operate
within the legal framework and enforce the law” duly enacted by the majoritarian
political process.22 I have no doubt that the often religiously inspired voters who
favored the enactment of legislation against Communists were sincere, committed,
and, in retrospect, even morally right, and that the Law Department faithfully
enforced their legislation. If, however, we are to live in a pluralist society committed
to protecting the rights of individuals, public lawyers must treat the rule of law—a
neutral, objective, principled standard limiting the power of government—as superior
to a religiously inspired agenda of a majority, however sincere, committed, and even
morally right that majority might be. Because the Tammany Law Department did
not raise the rule of law as an obstacle in the majority’s path, intolerance resulted and
a minority suffered.
Judge Crotty undoubtedly is correct that intolerance resulting in oppression of
minorities has frequently occurred in American history: he mentions the Palmer
raids in the aftermath of World War I, the internment of Japanese-Americans during

18. Id. at 211.
19.

Crotty, supra note 2, at 520, 528.

20. Id. at 523–25.
21.

Nelson, supra note 1, at 196.

22.

Crotty, supra note 2, at 525.
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World War II, and activity after the terrorist attack on 9/11.23 One could also cite
earlier examples, such as the banishment of religious dissenters from seventeenth
century Massachusetts Bay, 24 the burning of the Ursuline Convent in Charlestown,
Massachusetts in 1834, 25 and the persecution that drove Mormons out of the
Northeast United States to Utah several years later.26 The frequency of intolerance,
however, neither excuses it nor eliminates the need to better understand why and
how it occurs.
We continue to live in a world where intolerance is frequently a by-product of
religious inspiration. We lawyers accordingly need to consider whether a professionally
administered rule of law, which demands respectful treatment of diverse opinions,
should trump religious peoples’ deepest faith when, as sometimes happens, the rule
of law provides the only barrier that keeps faith from turning into intolerance. Allen
Schwartz’s achievement lay in his imbuing the Law Department with a commitment
to the power of professionalism. Judge Crotty, as already noted, appears to disagree.
He believes that, even if they are a product of intolerance, “validly enacted statutes
should be enforced, until held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction.”27
My own view about how to balance the power of a democratic majority against
the rights of unpopular minorities is irrelevant. I tried to write Fighting for the City
to portray the arguments for both majority power and minority rights fairly and
sympathetically. I even had the temerity in a book dedicated to Allen Schwartz’s
achievements and memory to note that “some readers might find Schwartz’s vision of
the Law Department disquieting.”28 I regret that Judge Crotty misunderstood my
attempt to raise questions about how government lawyers should respond to religiously
inspired majority policies as a “screed” attacking the Catholic Church, 29 for whose
opposition to Communism I have, in fact, the highest respect. I am pleased, on the
other hand, that several former Corporation Counsels who wrote essays for this
symposium, as well as Judge Crotty in his oral remarks, took up the book’s invitation
to explore what role, if any, professionalism should play in trumping majoritarian
intolerance.

23.

Id. at 524.

24.

See 1 William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America: The Chesapeake and New
England, 1607–1660, at 54–55 (2008).

25.

See Ray Allen Billington, The Burning of the Charlestown Convent, 10 New Eng. Q. 4 (1937).

26. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional

Conflict in Nineteenth Century America 24–25 (2002).
27.

See Crotty, supra note 2, at 529.

28. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 268.
29. See Crotty, supra note 2, at 521.
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